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Introduction
Over the past decade, increasing numbers of male 1 students have
filed federal lawsuits against colleges and universities alleging that Title
IX sexual misconduct proceedings are infected with gender bias against
men.2 The number of suits filed has risen from about one per year prior
to 2011 to one per week in 2018-19. 3 Male students typically allege that
the federal government has pressured post-secondary institutions to unfairly favor complainants, who are often women or gender nonconforming people, over respondents, who are almost invariably male.4
Male students have advanced an array of legal theories—including
breach of contract and due process—in federal court to challenge universities’ Title IX proceedings.5 However, this Note will focus exclusive1. Throughout this Note, “male” and “female” are used interchangeably with “men”
and “women.” “Male” and “female” are not used in this Note to refer to “biological”
sex, nor are they intended to exclude trans individuals. These terms are intentionally
used interchangeably to call attention to the false dichotomy between supposedly
“biological” sex and “culturally-constructed” gender. “Biological” sex is itself culturally constructed: “‘sex’ is not a static, distinct, or even strictly biological characteristic
that exists prior to the relations and practices that produce it.” Katrina Karkazis, The
Misuses of “Biological Sex”, 394 LANCET 1898, 1899 (2019).
2. See, e.g., Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_campus_
sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_efforts.single.html [https://perma.cc
/K72M-PXV5]; see also Greta Anderson, More Title IX Lawsuits by Accusers and Accused,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/03
/students-look-federal-courts-challenge-title-ix-proceedings [https://perma.cc/252WKB59] (noting that “legal challenges in federal court exploded” following the Obama
administration’s Title IX guidance).
3. Catherine Rentz, Ex-UMBC Baseball Players, Part of National Trend, Turning Tables on
Sexual Assault Accuser in Court, BALT. SUN (July 8, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/
maryland/baltimore-county/bs-md-baltimore-county-counter-claims-20190401-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6YD5-6FAR].
4. DAVID CANTOR, BONNIE FISHER, SUSAN CHIBNALL, REANNE TOWNSEND,
HYUNSHIK LEE, CAROL BRUCE & GAIL THOMAS, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS
CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND MISCONDUCT 20 (Westat ed., 2020)
[hereinafter CANTOR ET AL.].
5. See infra Part II (discussing the most common legal theories advanced by plaintiffs in
Title IX anti-male bias lawsuits).

2022]

TI TLE I X AND THE ALLEGED VICTIMIZATI ON OF MEN

283

ly on claims brought under Title IX alleging gender discrimination
against men.
In 2016, with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (Second Circuit)’s Doe v. Columbia University decision, a circuit
split emerged among federal courts about the proper pleading standard
to apply in gender discrimination claims brought by men under Title
IX.6 The Second Circuit employs a “temporary presumption” in favor
of the plaintiff for pleading discriminatory intent,7 while all other federal circuits that have considered the question employ the “plausibility
standard” required by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.8 The “temporary presumption” permits plaintiffs to plead fewer
facts to survive a motion to dismiss; a plaintiff must merely plead facts
sufficient to establish “a minimal plausible inference of discriminatory
intent.”9
Contrast the Second Circuit’s “temporary presumption” with the
pleading standard developed in Twombly and Iqbal: The Supreme Court
of the United States in Twombly and Iqbal established a “plausibility
standard” for pleading that requires “not only…the pleading of facts
that state the claim, but the pleading of facts that demonstrate the plausibility of a claim.”10 The Second Circuit first applied the “temporary
presumption” to Title IX cases in Doe v. Columbia University, and explicitly stated that the “temporary presumption” reduces the plaintiff’s
pleading burden in Title IX cases below the pleading burden established
in Twombly. 11 Despite the consensus among the vast majority of federal
courts that Twombly’s plausibility standard applies to Title IX anti-male
bias claims, commentators have frequently favored applying the Second
Circuit's approach to Title IX anti-male bias claims and have urged oth-

6. Compare Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016), with Doe v. Miami
Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018). There are thirteen federal circuit courts of appeals in the United States. These courts hear cases appealed from federal district
courts, which are trial level courts that have jurisdiction over claims arising under
federal law and claims with parties from different states where the potential award
meets a certain monetary threshold. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit hears cases appealed from federal district courts in Connecticut, New
York, and Vermont.
7. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662 (2009).
8. This includes discrimination cases arising under Title VII and Title IX. Littlejohn v.
City of New York., 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying the “temporary presumption” to a Title VII employment discrimination case).
9. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2016).
10. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 444 (2008).
11. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 54.
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er circuits to adopt it. 12 However, the apparent consensus among a majority of federal courts—that the Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility standard”
should apply—obscures the vastly different ways in which individual
circuits apply the “plausibility standard” to evidence of alleged gender
bias presented by male plaintiffs.
This Note provides a survey of the current state of Title IX law as
applied to anti-male bias lawsuits and suggests how courts should apply
Twombly’s plausibility standard to anti-male bias claims going forward.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of sexual violence on college
campuses and the history of Title IX regulations and jurisprudence. Part
II offers a brief history of Title IX anti-male bias lawsuits, examines the
structure of anti-male bias lawsuits, and analyzes the various pleading
standards applied by courts. Part III lays out the types of facts pled by
Title IX anti-male bias plaintiffs and discusses what facts should be
viewed as sufficient to meet Twombly’s plausibility standard. In Part IV,
this Note looks at the future of Title IX anti-male bias lawsuits in light
of new federal regulations and discusses the implications of these lawsuits for claimants and respondents in campus Title IX proceedings.
I. SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS AND THE ROLE OF TITLE IX
Sexual violence on college campuses is a pervasive problem. According to a 2019 survey of college students, 25.9% of undergraduate
women, 26.4% of trans or genderqueer undergraduates, and 6.9% of
undergraduate men experience rape through physical force, violence, or
incapacitation. 13 The percentage of undergraduate women who report
having experienced rape has actually increased in the past thirty years,14
as demonstrated by a 1985 survey of undergraduate women, in which
only “15 percent of college women reported experiencing legal rape.”15

12. See Weiru Fang, Note, Gender Parity: The Increasing Success and Subsequent Effect of
Anti-Male Bias Claims in Campus Sexual Assault Proceedings, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
467 (2019) (arguing that federal courts should adopt the Second Circuit’s temporary
presumption in Title IX anti-male discrimination cases); see also Bethany A. Corbin,
Riding the Wave or Drowning?: An Analysis of Gender Bias and Twombly/Iqbal in Title
IX Accused Student Lawsuits, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665 (2017).
13. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 4, at 6.
14. Mary Koss, Christine Gidycz & Nadine Wisniewski, The Scope of Rape: Incidence and
Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 162, 162 (1987) [hereinafter
Koss et al.] (finding that 15% of undergraduate women reported “experiencing legal
rape” and 4.4% of men reported perpetrating “legal rape”).
15. Id.
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One explanation for the increase in women reporting rape is that the
definition of rape has expanded significantly between 1985 and 2019.
The 1985 study defined rape as “oral, anal, vaginal penetration, or penetration by objects through threat, force, or intentional incapacitation of
the victim via drugs.”16 In contrast, the 2019 survey included “inability
to consent” in its definition of rape.17 The survey defined “inability to
consent” as “when the student was unable to consent or stop what was
happening because they were passed out, asleep, or incapacitated due to
alcohol or drugs.”18 Unlike the 1985 study’s definition of rape, the 2019
survey included unconsciousness that was not induced by the perpetrator. Additionally, the 2019 survey asked students about nonconsensual
sexual contact that occurred due to coercion or without voluntary
agreement.19 The 2019 survey’s question about nonconsensual sexual
contact that occurred without voluntary agreement asked students to
report “incidents that occurred without [their] active ongoing voluntary
agreement.”20 This definition adopts a version of “affirmative consent,”
which assesses whether parties affirmatively agreed to participate in the
entire sexual encounter and in each of the acts involved.21 Affirmative
consent is a relatively recent reworking of the traditional definition of
consent, and as of 2016 over 1,400 colleges and universities employ
some definition of affirmative consent.22 The definition of rape employed by the 2019 survey is considerably broader than the 1985 study’s
definition.
Because earlier definitions of rape set a high bar for what conduct
qualified as rape, conduct that today would be classified as rape was not
reported or documented. 23 Further, the narrow definition of rape meant
many victims were unsure whether sexual violence they experienced was

Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
CANTOR ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at A5-26
What Consent Looks Like, RAINN (AUG. 8, 2021), https://www.rainn.org/articles
/what-is-consent [https://perma.cc/4M23-256D].
22. Sandy Keenan, Affirmative Consent: Are Students Really Asking, N.Y.TIMES (July 28,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/education/edlife/affirmative-consentare-students-really-asking.html [https://perma.cc/6JSW-2UE5]. (noting that traditionally, colleges and the law have followed a “no means no” approach to consent;
consent exists unless a party verbally objects to sexual contact).
23. See With Expanded Definition, Rape is Reported More Often, NPR (Feb. 23, 2014,
4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/02/23/281731761/with-expanded-definitionrape-is-reported-more-often [https://perma.cc/72BL-P8X3] (noting that after the FBI
adopted a broader definition of rape, more rapes were reported).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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“bad enough” to qualify as rape. 24 Today, colleges and universities are
working to increase awareness among students and employees about
sexual violence. 25 In particular, universities are striving to inform students of each university’s own definition of sexual violence. 26 Therefore,
the supposedly higher rates of sexual violence on campus may actually
reflect students’ increasing willingness to report instances of sexual violence that historically would not have been defined as rape.
Students who have experienced sexual violence report negative academic and professional consequences, including decreased class attendance, difficulty concentrating on assignments, and missing work. 27 Additionally, only 45% of students believed school administrators would
take their allegations seriously. 28 Cis women, cis men, and trans or genderqueer undergraduates are all at risk of being victims of sexual violence on campus. The gender make-up of perpetrators of sexual violence
in the 2019 study was similarly diverse. However, the gender make-up
of perpetrators varied depending on the gender of the victim. Among
women, “virtually all . . . (99%) reported a man was the offender.”29 For
men, about two-thirds of perpetrators were women, while one-third
were men. 30 For trans or genderqueer students, around 85% of perpetrators were men. 31 Overall, “roughly 98% of perpetrators are male.”32
The vast majority of reported perpetrators are men because, while men
are victims of sexual violence, the overwhelming majority of victims are
women, trans, or genderqueer students who disproportionately report
men as perpetrators.

24. See Lindsay Orchowski, Douglas Meyer & Christine Gidycz, College Women’s Likelihood to Report Unwanted Sexual Experiences to Campus Agencies: Trends and Correlates,
18 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 839, 841 (2009) [hereinafter Orchowski et al.] (noting that victims may not classify sexual assault they have experienced as a crime, particularly if the perpetrator is an acquaintance).
25. CHRIS LINDER, SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS: POWER-CONSCIOUS APPROACHES
TO AWARENESS, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE 42 (2018).
26. Where Colleges Stand on Sexual Misconduct and Title IX, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED.
(Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/where-colleges-stand-on-sexualmisconduct-and-title-ix [https://perma.cc/8UND-2UDZ] (providing an overview of
new policies implemented by colleges to address campus sexual misconduct, including mandatory trainings and outreach to students).
27. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 4, at 26-27.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at 20.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Maddie Brockbank, The Myth of the “Gray Area” of Rape: Fabricating Ambiguity and
Deniability, 4 DIGNITY: J. ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & VIOLENCE 1, 3 (2019).
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Cultural commentary has focused on the supposedly high risk of
men being falsely accused of sexual assault.33 This commentary positions
men not as perpetrators, but as the true victims.34 After the #MeToo
movement gained ground in the popular consciousness, men began
tweeting using the hashtag #HimToo to raise concerns about men being
falsely accused of sexual assault.35 Lawyers representing men accused of
rape have embraced this narrative and blamed female accusers for ruining their clients’ lives. 36 College campuses in particular have become a
flashpoint for discussions about false rape accusations. The Other
McCain, a self-described men’s rights website, described a climate of
false accusations on college campuses as a “‘rape culture’ hysteria ginned
up by the Obama administration and its feminist allies” resulting “in
male students being falsely accused of rape and denied their due-process
rights in campus kangaroo-court disciplinary proceedings.”37 However,
scholars estimate that only about 0.005% of all rape allegations are
false.38 Critics have pointed out that this statistic focuses on false reports
to law enforcement, not Title IX accusations. 39 However, studies have
not demonstrated that false accusations of sexual assault are significantly
higher on college campuses.40

33. See Bret Stephens, Opinion, For Once, I’m Grateful for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/trump-kavanaugh-ford-allegations.html
[https://perma.cc/G7HM-TAN6] (noting that false accusations of rape are more common
than false accusations of other crimes, and that “falsely accusing a person of rape is nearly
as despicable as sexual assault itself”).
34. Sarah Banet-Weiser, ‘Ruined’ Lives: Mediated White Male Victimhood, 24 EUR. J.
CULTURAL STUD. 60, 69 (2021).
35. Emma Gray Ellis, How #HimToo Became the Anti #MeToo of the Kavanaugh Hearings,
WIRED (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/brett-kavanaugh-hearingshimtoo-metoo-christine-blasey-ford/ [https://perma.cc/83HP-GD8L] (identifying one
tweet that read, “Mothers of sons should be scared. It is terrifying that at any time, any
girl can make up any story about any boy that can neither be proved or disproved, and
ruin any boy’s life.”).
36. Id.
37. Feminism’s Excuse Factory: Nikki Yovino, Title IX and False Rape Accusations, OTHER
MCCAIN (July 17, 2017), http://theothermccain.com/2017/07/17/nikki-yovino-falserape-accusation-campus-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/N4QG-QNF4].
38. Joanne Belknap, Rape: Too Hard to Report and Too Easy to Discredit, 16 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1335, 1335 (2010).
39. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Education Dept. Clarifies DeVos Comments on Sexual Assault,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/03
/14/education-department-devos-says-false-reports-sexual-assault-are-rare [https://perma.cc
/FCX2-F63G].
40. See David Lisak, Lori Gardinier, Sarah C. Nicksa & Ashley M. Cote, False Allegations
of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1318 (2010) [hereinafter Lisak et al.] (estimating that, during a 10-year pe-
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Compared to the relatively insignificant number of false allegations, a large number of male college students admit to having engaged
in sexually coercive behavior. 41 In one study of a large, Division I southeastern university, 46% of male survey respondents admitted to engaging in sexually coercive behavior. 42 Despite the self-admittedly high rates
of sexual assault perpetrated by male college students, people are often
hesitant to attribute fault to individual men. 43 One explanation for the
public’s unwillingness to believe that specific men are guilty of rape is
that while they “are willing to believe in the abstract concept of rape,
they were not willing to believe that a man they knew. . . could commit
rape himself.”44 This is especially exacerbated in the college context
when alleged perpetrators do not match myths about what a perpetrator
“should” look like. Poor men of color are stereotyped as the “typical”
perpetrator. 45 When the public sees a “good guy”—a white, middle-class
college student accused of rape by a fellow college student—they “are
less inclined to label him as a rapist.46 Because so many male college
students fit the “good guy” profile, victims and universities can struggle
to persuade the public that individual men accused of sexual violence
are actually guilty.
Discussions of male victimhood in the Title IX context have primarily focused on the risk of false accusations. However, the attention
given to false accusations distracts from the reality that men are more
likely to be victims of sexual violence themselves than falsely accused of

41.

42.
43.

44.
45.
46.

riod at a major northeastern university, between 2 and 10 percent of allegations of
sexual assault were false).
See Belinda-Rose Young, Sarah L. Desmarais, Julie A. Baldwin & Rasheeta Chandler,
Sexual Coercion Practices Among Undergraduate Male Recreational Athletes, Intercollegiate Athletes, and Non-Athletes, 23 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 795, 796 (2017)
[hereinafter Young et al.]. The study defines sexually coercive behavior “any unwanted oral, vaginal or anal penetration as a result of verbal or physical pressure, including
rape.”
Id. at 803.
See, e.g. KATE MANNE, DOWN GIRL: THE LOGIC OF MISOGYNY 198 (2018) (discussing the trial of Brock Turner and testimony from one of Turner’s female friends describing him as a good person who could not be a monster who committed sexual assault).
Katie Heaney, Almost No One is Falsely Accused of Rape, THE CUT (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.thecut.com/article/false-rape-accusations.html [https://perma.cc/PYF5SQL9].
Taylor Martinez, Jacquelyn D. Wiersma-Mosley, Kristen N. Jozkowski & Jennifer
Becnel, “Good Guys Don’t Rape”: Greek and Non-Greek College Student Perpetrator
Rape Myths, 8 BEHAV. SCI. 1, 2 (2018) [hereinafter Martinez et al.].
Id.

2022]

TI TLE I X AND THE ALLEGED VICTIMIZATI ON OF MEN

289

rape. 47 Male college students are 78% more likely than men of the same
age who are not students to be victims of rape or sexual assault. 48 Men’s
rights organizations have characterized campus sexual assault proceedings as a power struggle between women, who supposedly fabricate allegations of sexual assault, and men, who are the exclusive victims of false
accusations. 49 These organizations largely ignore the existence of male
victims of sexual violence. Reducing sexual violence on campus would
benefit many male college students, who are too often victims of sexual
violence themselves.
A. How Title IX Came to Be Applied to Sexual Misconduct
Congress enacted Title IX to address educational inequalities faced
by women.50 Title IX prohibits sex-based discrimination in any educational program or activity that receives federal funds51 and is commonly
known for expanding athletic opportunities for women at all levels of
education, though the text of Title IX is not limited to addressing inequality in athletics.52 Notably, the text of Title IX does not mention
sexual harassment or sexual violence. Title IX states that “no person
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”53 While the
text of Title IX does not explicitly mention sexual harassment and sexual violence, the United States Supreme Court has read Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination “broadly to encompass diverse forms of in47. See Cindy Dampier, Your Son is More Likely to be Sexually Assaulted than to Face
False Allegations. Explaining the Fear of #HimToo, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-life-false-rape-allegations-20181011story.html [https://perma.cc/53KT-SX2M].
48. Campus Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campussexual-violence [https://perma.cc/2SMM-JZDA] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
49. See Emily Matchar, ‘Men’s Rights’ Activists are Trying to Redefine the Meaning of Rape,
NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 26, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/116768/latesttarget-mens-rights-movement-definition-rape [https://perma.cc/46Y5-XDBD] (describing how various men’s rights groups have latched onto supposedly false allegations of sexual assault, including a group that created posters saying ‘just because you
regret a one-night stand, doesn’t mean it wasn’t consensual’).
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX 2
(2012).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
52. Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process That is Due: Preponderance of the Evidence as the
Standard of Proof for University Adjudications of Student-on-Student Sexual Assault
Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2012).
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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tentional sex discrimination.”54 This broad interpretation of intentional
sex discrimination has come to include student-on-student sexual harassment and sexual violence.
In 1997, during the Clinton administration, the Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) published guidance that interpreted Title IX to prohibit
sexual harassment. 55 The 1997 Guidance stated that schools will be liable for student-on-student sexual harassment if “(i) a hostile environment exists in the school’s programs or activities, (ii) the school knows
or should have known about the harassment, and (iii) the school fails to
take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”56 Two Supreme
Court decisions in the 1990s, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education and Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, also interpreted
Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination to extend to sexual harassment. 57 These decisions built on the Court’s Title VII precedent holding sexual harassment to be a form of sex discrimination. In Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, a case involving a Title VII sex discrimination
claim, the Court concluded that “when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.”58 Relying on Vinson, the Court in Gebser
concluded that sexual harassment of a student by a teacher was a form
of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX. 59 In Davis, the Court permitted a student to sue a school board under Title IX for failure to stop
student-on-student sexual harassment.60 The Davis Court concluded
that in certain circumstances, “deliberate indifference to known acts of
harassment . . . amounts to an intentional violation of Title IX.”61
Notably, the Davis Court’s deliberate indifference standard of liability was a more favorable standard for institutions than the one promulgated in OCR’s 1997 Guidance.62 However, in 2001, on the final day
of the Clinton administration, OCR announced that it would continue

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 183 (2005).
OFF. OF C.R., DEP’T. OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE (1997).
Id.
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
R. Shep Melnick, The Strange Evolution of Title IX, NAT’L AFF. Summer 2018, at 19,
28.
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to enforce the 1997 Guidance. 63 OCR interpreted Davis as “limited to
private actions for monetary damages”64 and therefore, Davis did not
apply to administrative regulations establishing what schools must do to
qualify for federal funding. 65 The Bush administration neither repealed
nor enforced the 1997 Guidance and, until 2011, there was little enforcement of institutions’ Title IX obligations to address sexual misconduct.66
B. Federal Guidance and Enforcement of Title IX During the
Obama and Trump Administrations
The Department of Education’s Title IX guidance and regulations
have varied significantly over the past decade depending on the presidential administration. In 2011, the Obama administration “launched a
concerted attack on the problem of sexual assault on college campuses.”67 In April of that year, OCR published a Dear Colleague Letter
(2011 DCL) supplementing the 2001 Guidance.68 The 2011 DCL
“provid[es] additional guidance and practical examples regarding the Title IX requirements as they relate to sexual violence.”69 This was the first
time OCR introduced the term “sexual violence” in the context of
schools’ Title IX obligations.70 Some commentators, like Jacob Gersen
and Jeannie Suk Gersen, have characterized the 2011 DCL’s extension
of Title IX to sexual violence as “a very significant, even fundamental,
shift in OCR’s position.”71 While a person generally cannot be subject
to criminal charges for sexual harassment, sexual violence “usually refers

63. OFF. OF C.R., DEP’T. OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE:
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD
PARTIES (2001).
64. Id.
65. Melnick, supra note 62.
66. Id.
67. R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX Rules on Sexual Misconduct, BROOKINGS (June 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research
/analyzing-the-department-of-educations-final-title-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct/
[https://perma.cc/P932-5348].
68. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Off. of C.R., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleague 1–2 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GCE-NZH4]
69. Id.
70. Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CAL. L. REV. 881, 900 (2016).
71. Id. at 901.
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to acts that are criminal.”72 To some commentators, requiring institutions to adjudicate potentially criminal acts is a significant departure
from earlier OCR guidance on sexual harassment. 73
Despite criticism, extending Title IX coverage to sexual violence is
a reasonable interpretation of Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination. Before the 2011 DCL, courts had already read Title IX to prohibit
student-on-student sexual harassment.74 Critics point to the criminal
nature of sexual violence to distinguish between sexual harassment and
sexual violence. However, courts in the Title VII context have found
employers liable for failing to respond appropriately to an employee’s
experience of sexual violence. The Ninth Circuit has held, in the context
of Title VII, that “being raped is, at a minimum, an act of discrimination based on sex. Thus, the employer’s reaction to a single, serious episode may form the basis for a hostile work environment claim.”75 The
rape at issue in that case was criminal, yet the act’s criminal nature did
not preclude Title VII liability. Similarly, universities should be liable
for failing to respond appropriately to sexual violence, even if the sexual
violence in question may also be criminal. Additionally, Title IX proceedings do not preclude students from also filing criminal charges
against an accused student.
The 2011 DCL established guidelines for schools to follow when
addressing sexual harassment and violence. Under the 2011 DCL,
schools were required to use a preponderance of the evidence standard
when evaluating allegations of sexual misconduct.76 While the majority
of schools had used a preponderance of the evidence standard prior to
the 2011 DCL, some schools used a higher evidentiary standard to adjudicate sexual misconduct – clear and convincing evidence. 77 If a
school using the clear and convincing evidence standard had refused to
72. Sexual Harassment, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/sexual-harassment [https://
perma.cc/X37E-37PY] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
73. See Gersen & Suk, supra note 70 at 906-07 (noting that internal Title IX investigations and tribunals “have the flavor of criminal tribunals because they discipline conduct that is called criminal in the federal statute and regulations at issue.”).
74. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that a
school district can be liable for peer-on-peer sexual harassment).
75. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2002).
76. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Off. for Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to
Colleague 1–2 (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6C7-TERJ].
77. Jake New, Burden of Proof in the Balance, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/12/16/will-colleges-still-use-preponderanceevidence-standard-if-2011-guidance-reversed [https://perma.cc/4L7L-PTV8] (noting
that 70 percent of U.S. colleges were using the preponderance of the evidence standard prior to the 2011 DCL).
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switch to preponderance of the evidence, the school would be in violation of Title IX. OCR justified requiring a preponderance of the evidence standard because preponderance of the evidence is used in other
civil rights litigation, like Title VII.78 Furthermore, OCR itself uses a
preponderance of the evidence standard “when it resolves complaints
against recipients.”79 In addition to the new evidentiary requirement,
schools were required to allow accusers to appeal decisions.80 Also, the
2011 DCL recommended that schools prohibit parties from crossexamining each other.81 Finally, the 2011 DCL urged schools to complete investigations within sixty days. 82
After OCR published the 2011 DCL, critics raised concerns about
requiring schools to use the preponderance of the evidence standard.
Critics alleged that using the lower evidentiary standard of preponderance of the evidence violated accused students’ due process rights,83 arguing that accused students in school disciplinary proceedings “face the
deprivation of a property interest in their continued education as well as
the reputational harm” of having a disciplinary mark on their record.84
Critics also argued that these harms meant schools should use a clear
and convincing evidence standard. 85 Additionally, commentators alleged that prohibiting accused students from cross-examining their accuser violated accused students’ due process rights.86
Contemporaneous to the 2011 DCL’s publication, OCR began
publishing a list of institutions under investigation for Title IX violations.87 OCR publicly threatened institutions on the list with revocation
of federal funding if OCR found an institution to be in violation of Ti78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.

Letter from Russlynn Ali to Colleague, supra note 76, at 1–2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Conor Friedersdorf, The ACLU Moves to Embrace Due Process on Title IX, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/aclu-title-ix/582118/
[https://perma.cc/3N2D-DA9A].
Weizel, supra note 52, at 1621.
Friedersdorf, supra note 83.
K.C. Johnson & Stuart Taylor, Opinion: The Path to Obama’s ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter,
WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy
/wp/2017/01/31/the-path-to-obamas-dear-colleague-letter/ [https://perma.cc/CK6TTUXA].
See OFF. OF C.R., DEP’T OF EDUC., PENDING CASES CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION
AT ELEMENTARY-SECONDARY AND POST-SECONDARY SCHOOLS, https://www2.ed.gov
/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/open-investigations/tix.html?queries%5Bstate
%5D=MI&queries%5Btod%5D=Title+IX+-+Sexual+Violence [https://perma.cc/H8AF92BB] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
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tle IX. 88 “OCR does not publish similar lists for other types of investigations that are still in progress.”89 Universities and critics have argued
that publishing ongoing investigations places universities under “a cloud
of suspicion.”90 Candice Jackson, acting director of OCR in 2017, described OCR’s database of schools as a “list of shame.”91 OCR also expressed support for a “single investigator model,” in which one person
would serve as the investigator, judge of the evidence, and decider of the
appropriate punishment.
In September of 2017, OCR issued a new Dear Colleague Letter
(2017 DCL) under the Trump administration that withdrew the 2011
DCL. 92 The 2017 DCL echoed many of the criticisms levied against the
2011 DCL. 93 OCR concluded that the 2011 DCL caused “the deprivation of rights for many students,” particularly accused students. 94 OCR
issued a press release announcing the withdrawal of the 2011 DCL, in
which OCR described the 2011 DCL as “creating a system that lacked
basic elements of due process and failed to ensure fundamental fairness.”95 In 2018, OCR issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to
amend regulations implementing Title IX. 96 The final rules were issued
in May of 2020, and became effective in August of that year. 97
OCR’s new rules require post-secondary institutions to “hold live
disciplinary hearings in sexual misconduct cases and allow crossexamination of witnesses.”98 The Department of Education “has insisted
that cross-examination is indispensable for determining the credibility of
88. Emily Yoffe, The Uncomfortable Truth About Campus Rape Policy, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-uncomfortabletruth-about-campus-rape-policy/538974/ [https://perma.cc/HPY6-BU56].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Benjamin Wermund, Title IX List Going Out of Print?, POLITICO (June 29, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-education/2017/06/29/title-ix-listgoing-out-of-print-221112 [https://perma.cc/NE6V-PVHU].
92. Letter from Candice Jackson, Assistant Sec’y, Off. for Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
to Colleague (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters
/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5GD-Q8NR].
93. Id. (citing to open letter from professors arguing that prior 2011 DCL denied due
process rights to students).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Nondiscrimination on he Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462 (Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified at
34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
97. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at
34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
98. Melnick, supra note 67.
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witnesses,” particularly “when other forms of evidence are unavailable.”99 This marks a sharp departure from OCR’s approach during the
Obama era, when schools were urged to adopt a “single investigator”
model and avoid live hearings and cross-examination. 100 The new rules
also require institutions to presume that students and employees accused
of sexual misconduct are innocent until proven guilty. 101 Decisionmakers must not “be employees of the Title IX coordinator,” which is
markedly different from the single investigator model pushed by the
Obama administration. 102 Finally, the new rules require institutions to
choose either the “preponderance of the evidence” or “clear and convincing” standard and apply that standard to all sexual misconduct cases, including those against faculty and staff. 103 Tenure rules, academic
freedom codes, or collective bargaining agreements often require that
proceedings against employees use the “clear and convincing” standard
of evidence.104 Because schools will often be required to use the “clear
and convincing” standard in cases against employees, schools will therefore also employ the “clear and convincing” standard in cases against
students.
C. Potential Changes to Title IX Under the Biden Administration
The Biden administration may decide to promulgate new regulations. President Biden “has . . . promised to strengthen Title IX.”105
During his time as vice president, Biden focused extensively on “violence against women and the prevalence of sexual violence.”106 President
Biden’s campaign website promises to “restore the Title IX guidance for
colleges, including the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter.”107 Biden’s campaign website also promises that Biden will “stand on the side of survivors, who deserve to have their voices heard, their claims taken seriously

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Greta Anderson, A Long and Complicated Road Ahead, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 22,
2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/01/22/biden-faces-title-ix-battlecomplicated-politics-and-his-own-history [https://perma.cc/3XHM-6N5N].
106. Id.
107. The Biden Plan to End Violence Against Women, BIDEN HARRIS, https://
joebiden.com/vawa/ [https://perma.cc/W39F-X3LZ] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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and investigated, and their rights upheld.”108 However, to repeal the
Trump administration’s rules, Biden’s administration “would need to go
through the same time-consuming process the department just completed.”109 During that process, “virtually all colleges and universities” will
be required to continue to follow the Trump administration’s rules. 110
D. Title IX’s Implied Private Right of Action
The federal government and private citizens have an array of options for enforcing Title IX. Though Title IX does not explicitly authorize a private right of action, the Supreme Court in Cannon v. University
of Chicago (1979) held that Title IX contained an implied private right
of action. 111 Courts are willing to imply private rights of action in cases
“where a private victim of a legal wrong is likely to be in the best position to know of the violation and to sue the violator.”112 Post-Cannon,
the federal government is able to delegate some of its enforcement responsibility to private citizens. The government can also track lawsuits
and recognize patterns, allowing the government to bring its own enforcement actions as necessary.
E. Disparate Impact Availability Under Title IX
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Title IX allows
for liability based on a disparate impact theory. 113 Title IX was modeled
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Court held in
Cannon that courts should look to Title VI jurisprudence when interpreting Title IX. 114 In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission
of the City of New York, the Court held that “discriminatory intent is not
an essential element of a Title VI violation, but . . . a private plaintiff
108. The Biden Agenda for Women, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/womens-agenda/
[https://perma.cc/E4EM-EY5F] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
109. Melnick, supra note 67.
110. Id.
111. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). A private right of action authorizes individual plaintiffs to bring claims to enforce their rights under a statute. Some
statutes expressly permit private parties to bring lawsuits, while others, like Title IX,
are silent about whether plaintiffs can bring individual claims. In the Title IX context, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX to impliedly permit private parties
to bring lawsuits.
112. Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (2014).
113. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 8:27 (3d ed. 2021).
114. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703-04.
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should recover only injunctive, noncompensatory relief for a defendant’s
unintentional violations of Title VI.”115 If courts continue to interpret
Title IX in lockstep with Title VI, then courts will likely limit disparate
impact claims under Title IX to injunctive, noncompensatory relief as
well.
Some lower courts have interpreted Title IX to prevent recovery of
money damages in disparate impact claims. In Horner v. Kentucky High
School Athletic Association, the Sixth Circuit held that proving “intentional discrimination is a prerequisite for money damages under Title IX
when a facially neutral policy is challenged under a disparate impact theory.”116 Therefore, a plaintiff suing under Title IX would need
to prove discriminatory intent in order to receive monetary damages,
despite the fact that courts read Title IX broadly to prohibit a wide
range of intentional discrimination. 117 Schools can, for example, be
found to have intentionally discriminated by failing to take an affirmative action to prevent student-on-student sexual harassment.
Though the Supreme Court has restricted the availability of disparate impact to claims asking for injunctive relief, plaintiffs discussed in
this Note are almost all requesting injunctive relief in addition to monetary damages. Because they are asking for injunctive relief, plaintiffs
could plead disparate impact as well as intentional discrimination.118
Despite having disparate impact as an available theory of liability, plaintiffs pleading disparate impact do not get access to money damages, and
therefore have little incentive to plead disparate impact causes of action.
Additionally, because of courts’ broad interpretation of intentional discrimination, there is no clear delineation between disparate treatment
and disparate impact suits under Title IX as there would be under Title
VII. Therefore, the Title IX plaintiffs discussed in this Note could argue
disparate impact if they wanted, but do not need to as the intentional
discrimination prohibition covers a wide range of conduct.
II. STRUCTURE OF TITLE IX ANTI-MALE BIAS LAWSUITS
Title IX anti-male bias lawsuits take various forms. However, plaintiffs tend to plead similar theories of liability and rely on similar evi115.
116.
117.
118.

Guardians Ass’n v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 (1983).
Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 2000).
See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 183 (2005).
See Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 173 F. Supp. 3d 586, 608 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s disparate impact theory, Court held that a disparate impact theory is
not available for recovery under Title IX).
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dence to prove intentional discrimination. As courts have heard increasing numbers of anti-male bias claims, they have developed varying
frameworks for evaluating these claims. Courts have borrowed from
each other to develop categories for anti-male bias suits. At least one circuit has adopted a lower pleading standard for anti-male bias lawsuits
than other civil actions.
First, this section provides a background on the increasing number
of anti-male bias lawsuits brought under Title IX. Next, this section
provides a survey of pleading standards employed by courts in anti-male
bias lawsuits. Finally, this section looks at theories of liability for finding
intentional discrimination in anti-male bias claims.
A. Recent Trends in Anti-Male Bias Lawsuits Under Title IX
Male students are suing universities under Title IX in increasing
numbers. The number of suits filed in federal court by male students
accused of sexual misconduct has risen from about one a year prior to
2011 to one a week in 2018-19. 119 Plaintiffs typically do not allege just
one cause of action and instead allege a combination of causes of action
based in breach of contract, due process, and Title IX, among others.
Plaintiffs frequently allege 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process challenges against public universities. 120
Since the Due Process Clause has a state action requirement, only plaintiffs who attend state universities can allege due process violations.121
Students at public universities have had some success alleging due pro119. Catherine Rentz, Ex-UMBC Baseball Players, Part of National Trend, Turning Tables
on Sexual Assault Accuser in Court, BALT. SUN, July 8, 2019.
120. See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018).
121. Note that a student attending private university might still have a cognizable due
process claim depending on the relationship between the government and the private
university. In S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir. 1998), the
court held that private action can be considered state action if “the state has, through
extensive regulation, exercised coercive power over, or provided significant encouragement to, the private actor.” A student could claim that the 2011 DCL and OCR
investigations provided significant encouragement to private actors, thereby making
“private” conduct qualify as state action for due process purposes. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (holding that state action is required for due process
challenge); See also Doe v. Washington & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL
4647996, at *8 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that: “Had Plaintiff been enrolled at a public university, he would have been entitled to due process and the proceedings against him might have unfolded quite differently. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, W & L is a private university, and as such, is generally not subject to the
constitutional protections of the Fifth Amendment.”).
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cess violations, but students at private universities have not. 122 Unlike
due process claims, breach of contract claims are available to students at
either private or public universities, and some students have gotten past
motions to dismiss on breach of contract claims. 123 Similarly, Title IX
claims are available to students at both public and private universities.
The increasing popularity of Title IX anti-male bias claims can be at
least partly explained by Title IX’s breadth of applicability as compared
to procedural due process. Title IX, unlike due process, applies to all
universities whether private or public; the only requirement is that a
university receive federal funds.124 Given Title IX’s reach, plaintiffs who
may be blocked from bringing a due process challenge are able to claim
a Title IX violation.
However, Title IX claims overcome motions to dismiss less frequently than procedural due process claims. A due process challenge requires a plaintiff to show that the school failed to provide adequate procedures to ensure a fair outcome.125 In contrast, a Title IX plaintiff must
show both an unfair outcome and that gender bias was a motivating factor in the unfair outcome.126 A plaintiff must allege that (1) the educational institution receives federal funding, (2) the plaintiff was excluded
from participation in or denied the benefits of an educational program,
and (3) that the educational institution in question discriminated
against the plaintiff based on gender in order to bring a Title IX
claim.127 Plaintiffs alleging suspension or expulsion due to anti-male bias
easily meet the first two requirements, but have often struggled to prove
that the disciplinary action was caused by anti-male bias. 128
Historically, courts have tended to dismiss Title IX anti-male bias
claims for failure to show a causal link between the unfair element and
gender bias.129 Courts often agreed that plaintiffs had called the reliability of the disciplinary proceeding into question but also generally found
122. Compare Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiff could
proceed on due process claim against public university for failing to provide opportunity to confront accuser in Title IX proceeding), with Doe v. Marymount Univ.,
297 F. Supp. 3d 573 (E.D. Va. 2018) (holding that private university was not subject
to requirements of 5th Amendment due process and therefore plaintiff could not
proceed on procedural due process claims).
123. See Corbin, supra note 12 at 2665.
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
125. See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018) (plaintiff alleged that university’s internal Title IX investigation and proceedings violated his due process rights).
126. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
127. Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019).
128. Columbia Coll. Chicago, 933 F.3d at 849.
129. Corbin, supra note 12, at 2688.
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that plaintiffs were unable to show that gender bias caused the unreliable outcome.130 Of twenty-eight Title IX anti-male bias cases brought
between 2009 and 2016, twenty cases were dismissed “for failure to adequately allege causation.”131 However, beginning in 2017, courts began
to permit more Title IX anti-male bias claims to proceed past the motion to dismiss stage.
B. The First Anti-Male Bias Case: Yusuf v. Vassar College
Though decided in 1994, the Second Circuit’s treatment of an anti-male bias lawsuit in Yusuf v. Vassar College has continued to influence
courts’ approaches to anti-male bias claims. 132 Yusuf, a male student at
Vassar College, was suspended for one semester after a panel assembled
by the college determined that he had sexually harassed a female student. 133 He sued under Title IX, alleging that Vassar College had discriminated against him as a man by finding him responsible for sexual
harassment.134 In support of his Title IX claim, Yusuf alleged that Vassar “‘historically and systematically rendered verdicts against males in
sexual harassment cases, solely on the basis of sex’ and that ‘males are
invariably found guilty, regardless of evidence, or lack thereof.’”135 The
district court dismissed Yusuf’s Title IX claim, holding that “the bald
assertion that the plaintiff was found guilty . . . because he was a male
confronting a female accuser is too conclusory to withstand a motion to
dismiss.”136 The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence the
district court dismissed as conclusory was sufficient to support a claim
of gender discrimination under Title IX. 137 The Court noted that “similar allegations, if based on race in employment decisions, would more
than suffice in a Title VII case, and we believe they easily meet the requirements of Title IX.”138
130. See, e.g., Mallory v. Ohio Univ., 76 F.App’x 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
plaintiff cast doubt on disciplinary proceedings but did not link that doubt to gender
bias).
131. Corbin, supra note 12, at 2697.
132. See, e.g., Doe v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., No. 19-CV-249, 2021
WL 719898 (W.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2021) (citing to and applying Yusuf while also noting some courts’ hesitancy to use Yusuf’s categories for Title IX claims).
133. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1994).
134. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 714.
135. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 827 F. Supp. 952, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev’d 35 F.3d 709 (2d
Cir. 1994).
136. Yusuf, 827 F. Supp. at 957.
137. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715-16.
138. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 716.
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In Yusuf, the Court established that “Title IX bars the imposition
of university discipline where gender is a motivating factor in the decision to discipline.”139 The Court cited to Title VII, which prohibits employment decisions where gender “was a motivating factor . . . even
though other factors also motivated the practice.”140 At the pleading
stage, a Title VII plaintiff need not show that gender was the but-for
cause of the adverse employment decision. 141 At trial, however, the defendant can demonstrate that they would have made the same employment decision absent gender. 142 If a court finds that an employer would
have made the same decision without considering gender, then the court
has effectively concluded that gender was not a but-for cause of the employment decision. 143 The employer may avoid liability by rebutting the
inference that gender changed the outcome of the employment decision.
Although the plaintiff must show gender was a motivating factor, the
plaintiff is not required to prove that gender discrimination was the defendant’s sole motive. 144
Yusuf held that a Title IX plaintiff must “allege particular facts sufficient to cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of
the disciplinary proceeding.”145 However, the plaintiff does not meet
their pleading burden merely by challenging the accuracy of the outcome. The plaintiff must also plead sufficient facts to demonstrate a
causal link between gender bias and the erroneous outcome.146 Merely
“conclusory allegation[s] of gender discrimination” are insufficient to
overcome a motion to dismiss.147 The court stated that evidence of a
causal connection could “be of the kind . . . found in the familiar setting
of Title VII cases.”148 In Title VII cases, plaintiffs pleading that sex was
a motivating factor in the employment decision may present either di-

Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (A plaintiff must plead “a particularized allegation relating to a
causal connection between the flawed outcome and gender bias. A plaintiff must thus
also allege particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding. Allegations of a causal connection in the case of
university disciplinary cases can be of the kind that are found in the familiar setting
of Title VII cases . . . .”).
147. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
148. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
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rect or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 149 The court in Yusuf
suggested that Title IX plaintiffs could similarly rely on either direct or
circumstantial evidence to show that gender was a motivating factor in
the decision to discipline.150
C. Theories of Liability for Anti-Male Bias Claims: Erroneous Outcome,
Selective Enforcement, and Archaic Assumptions
Yusuf v. Vassar College remains highly influential for courts evaluating anti-male bias claims under Title IX. 151 In Yusuf, the Second Circuit
established two categories that most anti-male bias claims will fall into:
erroneous outcome and selective enforcement. 152 An erroneous outcome
claim alleges that “the plaintiff was innocent and wrongly found to have
committed the offense.”153 Gender bias must be “a motivating factor
behind the erroneous finding.”154 A selective enforcement claim asserts
that, irrespective of the plaintiff’s guilt or innocence, “the severity of the
penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected by
the student’s gender.”155 The court stressed that under either theory the
plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between gender bias and
the outcome in the plaintiff’s particular disciplinary proceeding. 156 Examples of allegations that could sustain a particularized causal connection include “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making
that also tend to show the influence of gender.”157 Most circuits have
adopted both the erroneous outcome and selective enforcement theories
of liability.158
The Sixth Circuit in Doe v. Miami University added a third theory
of liability for plaintiffs attacking the outcome of a university disciplinary proceeding: archaic assumptions. 159 Prior to Miami University, the
149. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that plaintiffs do not need
to present direct evidence to obtain mixed-motive instructions).
150. See Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (plaintiff could show “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decisionmaking that also tend to show the influence of gender.”).
151. Fang, supra note 12, at 474.
152. Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
153. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
154. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
155. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
156. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
157. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
158. Corbin, supra note 12, at 2686.
159. Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018).
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Sixth Circuit had only recognized an archaic assumptions theory of liability in the athletic context.160 The archaic assumptions theory “finds
discriminatory intent in actions resulting from classifications based upon archaic assumptions.”161 The plaintiff in Mallory v. Ohio, another
Sixth Circuit anti-male bias case, involved a university Title IX investigation where both the plaintiff, a man, and the woman made crossclaims of sexual assault against each other. 162 Plaintiff alleged that the
university’s decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him and
not the woman was a product of archaic assumptions held by university
administrators about who assaulted whom.163 The court held that the
plaintiff and the woman were not similarly situated and therefore did
not “establish that the University’s disciplinary proceeding against Mallory was motivated by his sex.”164 Only the Sixth Circuit has adopted an
archaic assumptions theory of liability.
A plaintiff may plead more than one of these theories of liability.165
Plaintiffs often plead all of them, with courts selecting which theory, if
any, actually fits the plaintiff’s case. However, some circuits have completely rejected certain theories used by anti-male bias plaintiffs. The
Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Purdue University rejected these theories because they merely restate the central question a court should answer: “do
the alleged facts, if true, raise a plausible inference that the university
discriminated against John ‘on the basis of sex’?”166 The Seventh Circuit
in Purdue University refocused the inquiry of Title IX anti-male bias
claims on whether gender bias was a motivating factor in the disciplinary action.
D. Applying Twombly to Anti-Male Bias Lawsuits
Yusuf was decided under the Conley v. Gibson notice pleading
standard, which allows a complaint to proceed “unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no sets of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”167 The Conley standard supported “a
liberal view of notice pleading,” where the purpose of pleading was

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Mallory v. Ohio, 76 F. App’x 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2003).
Mallory, 76 F. App’x at 638-639.
Mallory, 76 F. App’x at 640.
Mallory, 76 F. App’x at 640.
Mallory, 76 F. App’x at 641.
Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2019).
Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 713 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
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simply to put the defendant on notice of the elements of the claim.168
Conley’s notice pleading standard has been replaced by the factual pleading standard announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal. In Iqbal, the Court held that a claim must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”169 A claim satisfies the facial plausibility requirement
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”170 Conclusory statements or mere recitations of the elements of
the claim are insufficient for facial plausibility. 171
While the Yusuf framework has remained influential for courts
considering Title IX claims, courts have sometimes struggled to apply
Yusuf in light of the heightened pleading standard established by
Twombly and Iqbal. 172 Courts differ over what facts are sufficient to
constitute a “plausible” claim of gender discrimination. Plaintiffs in Title IX anti-male bias cases often present evidence that has various explanations, some discriminatory and some not. 173 At the motion to dismiss
stage, courts differ in the weight they give to alternative, nondiscriminatory explanations for conduct that plaintiffs allege indicates
gender bias. The United States Supreme Court addressed the weight
courts should give to alternative, non-discriminatory explanations in a
constitutional discrimination and § 1983 claim in Iqbal. The Court
concluded that Iqbal’s factual allegations “failed to create an inference of
discrimination that was more plausible than alternative explanations for
the defendants’ conduct.”174 Therefore, at least in constitutional discrimination and § 1983 actions, the discriminatory explanation for
conduct can fail to satisfy Twombly’s plausibility standard if alternative,
non-discriminatory explanations for conduct are more plausible.

168. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 47(A), at 197 (1994).
169. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
170. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
171. Conclusory statements are those which provide no supporting evidence and merely
state a conclusion. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
172. Corbin, supra note 12, at 2691.
173. See Doe v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1075-78 (D. Colo. 2017)
(Plaintiff alleging that women were mostly accusers and men were mostly accused,
which could be explained by either gender bias or that men tended to disproportionately commit assaults. Court said there are some moments when alternative explanation overwhelms inference of discrimination).
174. J. Scott Pritchard, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining the Impact of
Twombly and Iqbal on Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s Litigation and Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 757, 766 (2011).
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While Iqbal exclusively dealt with constitutional and § 1983
claims, courts have since applied the Court’s reasoning in Iqbal to Title
IX anti-male bias claims. In Doe v. University of Colorado at Boulder, the
District Court applied Iqbal’s analysis to a Title IX anti-male bias claim.
The plaintiff, a man, was expelled after the Title IX office concluded by
a preponderance of the evidence that he had raped two female students.175 He claimed that the university primarily disciplined men for
sexual misconduct and that this higher rate of punishment supported an
inference of gender bias.176 However, the court concluded that the gender disparity in punishment stemmed from the fact that the majority of
accusers are women and the majority of the accused are men. 177 The
court found this non-discriminatory explanation to be “an ‘obvious alternative explanation’ . . . that overwhelm[ed] any potential inference of
gender bias.”178 The court accordingly dismissed the plaintiff’s Title IX
anti-male bias claim for failing to meet the plausibility requirement. 179
E. Reconciling Swierkiewicz and Twombly
The Supreme Court in Twombly stated that its holding was compatible with an earlier decision, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema. 180 In
Swierkiewicz, the Court held that a pleading in an employment discrimination case need “not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination.”181 The Court in Swierkiewicz also held that
courts could not impose a higher pleading standard in Title VII cases
than in other civil cases.182 In Twombly, the Supreme Court reconciled
its new, heightened pleading standard with Swierkiewicz, writing “here,
the Court is not requiring heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only
enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.”183 The
Court seemed to believe that Twombly did not overrule Swierkiewicz,
and that the two cases remained compatible.
While the Court suggested that Twombly did not affect its holding
in Swierkiewicz, lower courts have struggled to reconcile the cases and
have developed two distinct approaches to resolving the apparent con175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1068.
Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1068.
Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1079.
Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1079.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547.
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tradiction. The first approach is to read Twombly as raising the pleading
standard in all civil cases, including discrimination cases. 184 Under this
approach, the central holding of Swierkiewicz, that discrimination cases
may not have higher pleading standards than other civil cases, is preserved because the pleading standard of all civil cases is raised. 185 Courts
employing this approach require Title IX plaintiffs to meet Twombly’s
facial plausibility standard: Plaintiffs must establish a facial case of discrimination in the pleadings. 186 The second approach is to read
Twombly as raising the pleading standard, but that Twombly’s plausibility standard does not force plaintiffs to plead a facial case of discrimination.187 Commentators have favored the second approach. In particular,
commentators have suggested that courts apply the plausibility requirement of Twombly too strictly in Title IX cases.188 Courts have required
plaintiffs to present evidence of discrimination in the pleadings. However, the evidence is often under the control of the defendant and therefore unavailable to the plaintiff absent discovery. 189 If Swierkiewicz is
still good law and plaintiffs do not need to plead a prima facie case of
discrimination, courts should ask whether the complaint, taken as a
whole, “renders a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief plausible.”190 Under
this view, Title IX plaintiffs should be required to allege only two elements: “(1) the unfavorable outcome occurred because of the plaintiff’s
gender and (2) limited, generalized circumstances that give rise to an inference of bias.”191
However, the Court in Iqbal established that courts should consider obvious alternative, non-discriminatory explanations for allegedly discriminatory conduct.192 Even if plaintiffs are not required to plead a
prima facie case of discrimination, courts will still consider whether the
inference of discrimination is more plausible than non-discriminatory
explanations. 193 The ability of courts to consider alternative, nondiscriminatory explanations limits the advantage given to plaintiffs by
reconciling Swiekierwicz and Twombly. A plaintiff who presents evidence with plausible alternative explanations is likely to have their case
dismissed.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019).
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508.
See, e.g., Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 2019 WL 4748310 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
Corbin, supra note 12, at 2694.
Id. at 2706.
Id. at 2707.
Id.
Id. at 2708.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009).
See, e.g., Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 75 (1st Cir. 2019).

2022]

TI TLE I X AND THE ALLEGED VICTIMIZATI ON OF MEN

307

F. The Second Circuit Approach: Doe v. Columbia University
In 2016, the Second Circuit adopted a new pleading standard for
Title IX anti-male bias lawsuits in Doe v. Columbia University. 194 The
Court imported the burden-shifting framework used in McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. Green from Title VII cases into the Title IX context.195
The court established a temporary presumption for plaintiffs in Title IX
cases, which “reduces the plaintiff’s pleading burden, so that the alleged
facts need support only a minimal inference of bias.”196 The court reconciled its temporary presumption with Iqbal’s plausibility requirement
of a discriminatory explanation, noting that Iqbal did not require “the
inference of discriminatory intent to be . . . the most plausible explanation.”197 A plaintiff satisfied the Iqbal plausibility requirement as long as
“the inference of discriminatory intent is plausible.”198 The court in Columbia University applied the temporary presumption and found that
the plaintiff had pleaded sufficient facts to support a minimal inference
of bias.199
Plaintiffs and commentators have urged other courts to adopt the
Second Circuit’s temporary presumption. 200 However, no court outside
the Second Circuit has adopted it. The Sixth Circuit in Doe v. Miami
University noted that the Sixth Circuit’s prior cases had reconciled
Swierkiewicz and Twombly differently than the Second Circuit.201 The
Sixth Circuit requires Title IX plaintiffs to “plead sufficient factual allegations to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal in alleging the required element of
discriminatory intent.”202 In light of the Sixth Circuit’s precedent, the
Sixth Circuit rejected a temporary presumption in favor of the Twombly
plausibility standard. 203 The Ninth Circuit in Austin v. University of Oregon also rejected the temporary presumption. 204 The Ninth Circuit
read “the Second Circuit’s application of the McDonnell-Douglas presumption at the pleading stage as contrary to Supreme Court precedent”

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016).
See McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 56.
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 57.
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 57.
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 59.
See Fang, supra note 12 (encouraging courts to adopt the Second Circuit’s “temporary presumption” in order to vindicate discrimination law).
Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018).
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589.
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589.
Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2019).
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and declined to embrace the approach. 205 The Second Circuit failed to
explain why Title IX anti-male bias cases uniquely warranted a lowered
pleading standard.
III. HOW COURTS SHOULD APPLY TWOMBLY/IQBAL TO TITLE IX
ANTI-MALE BIAS CLAIMS
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’”206 Plaintiffs in Title IX anti-male bias cases rely
on an array of evidence to meet the plausibility requirement. The Second Circuit in Yusuf established that plaintiffs must (1) challenge the
accuracy of the outcome in their particular case and (2) link gender bias
to the inaccurate outcome.207 Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss,
a Title IX anti-male bias plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to render plausible the claim that the university’s decision was
wrong and that the wrong outcome was motivated by gender bias. Title
IX plaintiffs tend to plead similar allegations, ranging from the hyperspecific—the decision-maker was biased against men—to broad claims
about the federal government’s guidance on Title IX law.
Plaintiffs in intentional discrimination cases, including the Title IX
cases discussed in this Note, attempt to prove that a defendant university acted with discriminatory intent when making the decision to investigate and punish sexual assault allegations. 208 A defendant’s state of
mind and intent is “usually unstated.”209 Sometimes, however, plaintiffs
present evidence of a discriminatory statement by a defendant, commonly referred to as direct evidence of discrimination. 210 Direct evidence of discriminatory intent “is evidence which, if believed, proves the
fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption.”211
However, this type of evidence is rare. 212 Because plaintiffs typically lack
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, plaintiffs must rely on circumstantial, or indirect, evidence to show intentional discrimination by a
defendant. 213 Indirect, circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination is
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Austin, 925 F.3d at 1137.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015).
Vega, 801 F.3d at 86.
Vega, 801 F.3d at 86.
Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005).
Vega, 801 F.3d at 86.
Vega, 801 F.3d at 86.
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sufficient to satisfy Iqbal’s standard of facial plausibility. The types of
evidence described in this section include both direct and indirect evidence.
The Court in Iqbal stated that “a claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”214 The Twombly Court clarified that “asking for plausible
grounds . . .simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”215 A claim has
facial plausibility if there is “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully.”216 Twombly/Iqbal also do not require illegal
conduct to be the most plausible or probable inference from the pleaded
facts. Therefore, even if alternative, non-discriminatory inferences exist
for pleaded facts, courts should not dismiss claims unless those alternative explanations are so obvious that they render the conclusion of discrimination implausible.217
Courts take varying and inconsistent approaches when evaluating
what evidence satisfies Iqbal’s facial plausibility requirement, leaving
universities uncertain about which conduct will result in Title IX litigation and liability. Instead of moving away from Iqbal’s facial plausibility
requirement, courts should instead apply Iqbal’s facial plausibility requirement predictably and consistently. This Section explains how
courts should apply Iqbal’s facial plausibility to each type of evidence
commonly presented by male Title IX plaintiffs in sexual misconduct
cases.
A. Behavior of Individual University Decisionmakers
In Yusuf, the Second Circuit expected that a Title IX anti-male bias
plaintiff would present factual allegations that included “statements by
members of the disciplinary tribunal [or] statements by pertinent university officials . . .that . . .tend to show the influence of gender.”218 An
individual decisionmaker’s statement admitting animus is especially
strong evidence that the plaintiff’s protected trait was a motivating fac214.
215.
216.
217.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim of discriminatory conduct
when alternative non-discriminatory explanation existed for allegedly discriminatory
conduct).
218. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
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tor in the decision.219 Therefore, courts will sometimes find discriminatory statements alone sufficient to satisfy the plausibility requirement.
For example, in Doe v. Marymount University, the plaintiff alleged that
the hearing officer made statements indicating that he believed men
could not be victims of sexual misconduct. 220 The Court held that “this
allegation alone [was] sufficient to satisfy Doe’s burden to plead a fact
that creates an inference of gender discrimination in Marymount’s disciplinary proceedings.”221 Similarly, in Saravanan v. Drexel University,
the plaintiff presented statements from a university administrator that
included a statement by the administrator that he “[had] never heard of
a female raping a male.”222 These statements alone were sufficient for
the plaintiff’s erroneous outcome claim to survive a motion to dismiss.
Courts seem particularly receptive to statements like the ones made in
Saravanan and Marymount that evince assumptions by decisionmakers
that only women can be victims of sexual assault.
Should plaintiffs present statements like those in Saravanan, courts
should accept these allegations as particularized facts supporting an inference of gender bias. Because the decisionmaker has control over the
outcome of the student’s case, any stereotypes or beliefs exhibited by the
decisionmaker are especially likely to influence the case. A Title IX antimale bias plaintiff must link gender bias to the erroneous outcome in
their individual case. This link is easy to make when a decisionmaker
has stated that gender stereotypes impacted their adjudication or handling of the case. The Court in Doe v. Brown University described
statements evincing gender bias as “smoking gun evidence,” which illustrates how strong this type of evidence is for plaintiffs. 223
Some courts also accept more ambiguous statements by administrators as evidence of gender bias. In Doe v. Washington and Lee University,
the university’s Title IX Officer gave a presentation that included an article titled “Is it Possible That There is Something Between Consensual Sex
and That it Happens to Almost Every Girl Out There?.”224 The Title IX
219. See, e.g., Harper v. Fulton Cnty., Ill., 748 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding
that an admission by the decisionmaker of discriminatory intent is evidence that
proves discriminatory intent “without reliance on inference or presumption”).
220. Doe v. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573, 585-86 (E.D. Va. 2018).
221. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d at 586.
222. Saravanan v. Drexel Univ., No. 17-3409, 2017 WL 5659821, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
24, 2017).
223. Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (D. R.I. 2016) (noting that, while
that particular case lacked a “smoking gun” statement of gender bias, the plaintiff had
still established allegations of gender bias sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss).
224. Doe v. Washington & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-cv-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *3
(W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015).
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Officer also stated that she believed “‘regret equals rape’ . . . and that this
point was a new idea that everyone, herself included, is starting to agree
with.”225 The Court found this statement sufficient for plaintiff’s erroneous outcome claim to survive a motion to dismiss.
Some plaintiffs have been able to survive a motion to dismiss by alleging that, upon information and belief, the university possesses communications “evidencing [the university’s] intent to favor female students alleging sexual assault over [accused] male students.”226 For
example, in Doe v. Brown University, the plaintiff presented a former
university employee’s statement that “Brown treats male students as
‘guilty until proven innocent’ . . . and that the fact-finding process . . . at
Brown operates under the assumption that it’s always the ‘boy’s
fault.’”227 The Brown University court explained that the fact that these
allegations were pleaded upon information and belief did not “make
them improper under Twombly and Iqbal.” 228 Twombly’s plausibility
standard does not prevent a plaintiff from “pleading facts alleged upon
‘information and belief’ where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant.” 229
Title IX plaintiffs should often be permitted to engage in “information and belief” pleading. If cases are more likely to be dismissed unless plaintiffs have access to information that is peculiarly within the
control of the university at the pleading stage, courts effectively turn the
motion to dismiss into summary judgment. Summary judgment is, traditionally, when the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s evidence is evaluated, not
the motion to dismiss. 230 Plaintiffs do not have access to discovery before defendants file motions to dismiss, and therefore struggle in discrimination cases when they do not have access to confidential information. In the Title IX context, students typically do not have access to
confidential Title IX communications between university administrators. Allowing the “information and belief” pleading standard in more
Title IX anti-male bias cases would likely address the high rates of dismissal of these types of cases. This approach is preferable to the Second
Circuit’s “temporary presumption” because courts that have rejected the
Second Circuit’s “temporary presumption” could still allow claims to
proceed under the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Washington & Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996, at *3.
Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d 748, 768 (D. Md. 2015).
Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d at 189.
Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d at 190.
Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d at 768.
See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Twombly and Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010).
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However, courts must still exercise some restraint when deciding
whether to permit complaints to proceed based solely on “information
and belief” pleading. It is insufficient for the plaintiff to merely plead
conclusory allegations of gender discrimination upon information and
belief. 231 As the District of Maryland in Doe v. Salisbury noted, the
plaintiff must plead “specific factual allegations.”232 Despite stating that
conclusory allegations are insufficient under Twombly, the court in
Salisbury permitted a claim to proceed on vague allegations that, upon
information and belief, the university possessed communications evincing a preference for female accusers.233 But the plaintiff in Salisbury did
not provide corroborating statements like those provided by the plaintiff
in Brown. Therefore, the court should not have permitted the gender
discrimination claim in Salisbury to survive the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs should not be permitted to plead “information and belief” if
they do not have reason to actually suspect that the university possesses
communications evincing gender bias.234
If plaintiffs are able to survive a motion to dismiss merely by pleading “upon information and belief” that the university possesses communications, every Title IX anti-male bias claim will proceed past motion
to dismiss. The Court in Iqbal established that the pleadings should
“permit the Court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”235 A complaint that merely alleges that the university may possess
communications, with no corroboration, does not nudge a claim from
possible to plausible. Courts should permit facts pleaded “upon information and belief” to support a claim’s plausibility only if the plaintiff
has some articulable reason for why they suspect the defendant will possess the information. Corroboration could come in the form of statements by former university officials or other avenues.
B. Statistics Evincing a Pattern of Gender-Based Disciplinary Decisions
Plaintiffs commonly rely on statistics to show that universities engaged in a pattern of gender-based decision-making. The statistical evi231. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d at 768 (noting that “plaintiffs’ erroneous outcome
allegations would be insufficient if they had simply stated something akin to: ‘upon
information and belief, procedural defects were motivated by gender bias.’”).
232. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d at 768.
233. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d at 768.
234. See Austin v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1225 (D. Or. 2016) (dismissing a
claim pleaded “on information and belief” because it did not contain the kinds of
statements by university officials contained in Brown).
235. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
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dence varies depending on the case, but plaintiffs often point to the
gender identities of accusers and accused students.236 Women comprise
the vast majority of complainants and men are the vast majority of respondents in almost every Title IX anti-male bias case.237
Courts differ in their approach to weighing this type of statistical
evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
stated that “the fact that sexual assault proceedings have been brought
only against male students is not in and of itself sufficient to infer gender bias.”238 The university “is not responsible for gender make-up of
those who are accused by other students of sexual misconduct.”239 Similarly, the First Circuit has noted that the gender make-up of accused
students “is the result of what is reported to the university, and not the
other way around.”240 Therefore, the mere fact that men are the majority of accused students does not provide a particularized causal link between gender bias and the outcome in the individual plaintiff’s case.
Some plaintiffs will also allege that the university has exclusively punished men for sexual misconduct.241 However, if a court accepts that the
gender make-up of accused students results from which students report
rather than gender bias on the part of the university, the fact that only
men are disciplined is also the product of reporting rather than gender
bias. The university can only discipline the pool of people that has been
reported to them by students, and if that pool is exclusively comprised
of men, then only men will be disciplined.
However, some courts are willing to accept the gender make-up of
accusers and accused students as probative of gender bias when combined with other evidence. In Doe v. University of Dayton, the Sixth Circuit stated that statistics could be combined with other evidence, such as
statements by university decisionmakers, to create a particularized claim
of gender bias. 242 When combined with evidence that a decisionmaker
was infected with gender bias, the statistics potentially become evidence
of a pattern of gender-based disciplinary decisions. 243 Alternatively, if
both men and women are accused of sexual misconduct, a plaintiff
236. See, e.g., Doe v. Miami Univ., 247 F. Supp. 3d 875, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2017), rev’d,
882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) (plaintiff alleging that only women were accusers and
only men were accused, resulting in only men being punished for sexual misconduct).
237. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Dayton, 766 F. App’x 275, 282 (6th Cir. 2019).
238. Univ. of Dayton, 766 F. App’x at 282.
239. King v. DePauw Univ., No. 14-cv-70, 2014 WL 4197507, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Aug.
22, 2014).
240. Doe v. Trustees of Boston Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 92 (1st Cir. 2018).
241. Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x 437, 453 (6th Cir. 2016).
242. Univ. of Dayton, 766 F. App’x at 281.
243. See Univ. of Dayton, 766 F. App’x at 281.
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could show that the school disproportionately investigates and punishes
men.244 However, the First Circuit in Brown University noted that this
type of comparative evidence about the university’s treatment of male
and female students is often difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to acquire at the pleading stage.245
If men disproportionately commit sexual violence, then it is unsurprising that men comprise the vast majority of students accused of and
punished for sexual violence. As the Court in Austin v. University of Oregon stated, “it is a simple fact that the majority of accusers of sexual assault are female and the majority of the accused are male, therefore enforcement is likely to have a disparate impact on the sexes.”246 If the fact
that universities disproportionately investigate and punish men is probative of gender bias, then any male student punished by a university that
primarily investigates and punishes men has a plausible claim of gender
bias. Courts should not consider the mere fact that primarily men are
punished for sexual assault as a factor in an assessment of whether gender bias is plausible.
The more challenging question is whether statistics should be considered alongside other evidence as increasing a claim’s plausibility, especially since this statistical evidence has an obvious alternative, nondiscriminatory explanation. Courts should dismiss Title IX anti-male
bias claims if an alternative, non-discriminatory explanation “overwhelms any inference” of discrimination.247 The “obvious alternative
explanation” must be more plausible than the discriminatory explanation. The court in Doe v. University of Colorado Boulder explained that,
in most cases, either a claim is plausible or it is not—“the degree of plausibility only becomes relevant when an ‘obvious alternative explanation’
overwhelms any inference of liability that might otherwise exist.”248
Therefore, once a court has identified an alternative, non-discriminatory
explanation for conduct, the court adjudicates whether the discriminatory explanation is more plausible than the alternative, nondiscriminatory explanation. In this case, the court must decide whether
the alternative explanation overwhelms any inference of discrimination
supported by the statistical evidence. Here, the obvious alternative, nondiscriminatory explanation for the gender make-up of accusers and accused students is that men commit sexual violence at high rates against
primarily female victims.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Doe v. Johnson & Wales Univ., 425 F. Supp. 3d 108, 116 (D. R.I. 2019).
Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 188 (D. R.I. 2016).
Austin v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1225 (D. Or. 2016).
Doe v. Univ. of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1076 (D. Colo. 2017).
Univ. of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1076.
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However, as the University of Colorado Boulder court noted, “if enforcement officials are regularly presented with a scenario involving the
same two potential classifications—nurse and female, taxi driver and ethnic minority, sexual assault suspect and male—there must
come a point when one may plausibly infer that stereotypes about the
protected classification (such as gender or ethnicity) have begun to infect the enforcement process generally.”249 Decisionmakers, if they are
repeatedly confronted with female victims and male perpetrators, may
begin to let gender influence their decisions. For example, a Title IX Officer deciding a case with a female victim and male perpetrator may
credit testimony from the woman but not the man due to the Officer’s
experiences in past cases. 250 The concerns expressed by the court in University of Colorado Boulder suggest that a court can infer that a decisionmaker is infected by bias merely because the decision-maker has seen
many cases where victims are women and perpetrators are men. The
court’s presumption of bias goes too far: this analysis would suggest that
all university decision-makers are presumed to be biased merely because
the majority of perpetrators are men and the majority of victims are
women in Title IX cases. Using the court’s logic, any Title IX official
would be presumed to be biased only because they have heard lots of
cases. The court ignores that many cases end with a finding of no responsibility, evincing that decision-makers likely do not “automatically”
credit women’s testimony over men’s.251 The court also ignores that officials hear cases where both claimant and respondent are women, or
where complainant is a man and respondent is a woman. The court
does not grapple with whether a decision-maker’s exposure to cases that
do not fit the stereotype would rebut an inference of discrimination. Finally, the University of Colorado Boulder court’s inference of discrimination rewards exactly the kind of conclusory statements Twombly forbade. A plaintiff, according to the University of Colorado Boulder court,
could simply plead “men are typically respondents and women are typi-

249. Univ. of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1076.
250. Univ. of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1076 (noting that in the Title IX context
enforcement officers are often required to make credibility determinations between
men and women and gender-specific stereotypes may influence how the Officer credits
testimony, e.g. “men always behave opportunistically towards drunk girls.”).
251. See Mariano Castillo, Universities Mishandled Sexual Assault Cases, Complaints Allege,
CNN (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/08/us/sexual-assault-title-ixcomplaints/index.html [https://perma.cc/6DBR-HBR3] (describing a lawsuit filed by
four women against four universities alleging Title IX violations in cases where alleged perpetrators were found not responsible or given minimal sanctions).
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cally claimants, and therefore the decision-maker is biased” 252 and the
court would deem that to be a plausible inference of gender bias.
Courts should require plaintiffs to present evidence that the decisionmaker in their individual case actually acted in ways that made the
outcome potentially unfair. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to survive
a motion to dismiss merely by pointing out that the majority of claimants are women and the majority of respondents are men, as suggested
by the University of Colorado Boulder, if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate
how those statistics manifested as bias in their individual case. The
plaintiff also cannot merely allege that the administration might have
felt pressure to punish male students more harshly. Instead, the plaintiff
must allege with particularity why, in their individual case, the university actually treated male students worse.
C. Comparing Treatment of Male and Female Students
Male plaintiffs in Title IX cases often point to the university’s
treatment of similarly situated female students as evidence of gender bias. Using a similarly situated comparator is common in Title VII employment discrimination cases. In order to provide a meaningful comparison, “the proposed comparator must be similar enough to permit a
reasonable juror to infer, in light of all the circumstances, that an impermissible animus motivated the employer’s decision.” 253 In the Title
IX context, plaintiffs advancing selective enforcement claims especially
rely on a comparator to show differential treatment.254 A selective enforcement claim under Title IX “asserts that, regardless of the student’s
guilt or innocence, the severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected by the student’s gender.”255 Plaintiffs
will also employ a comparator in erroneous outcome claims. For example, the plaintiff in Rolph v. Hobart and William Smith Colleges alleged
that the university helped the female claimant prepare her case, while
doing nothing to help him prepare his own case. 256 Plaintiffs also often

252. Univ. of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 1076.
253. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012).
254. See, e.g., Doe v. Haas, 427 F. Supp. 3d 336, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s Title IX selective enforcement claim because plaintiff did not allege that “disciplinary proceedings were not initiated against similarly situated females or that similarly situated females found guilty of the same offense received a less severe penalty.”).
255. Yusuf v. Vassar C., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
256. Rolph v. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 271 F. Supp. 3d 386, 402 (W.D.N.Y.
2017).
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argue that administrators exclusively and arbitrarily credited testimony
from women.257
Selective enforcement plaintiffs often struggle to move past the motion to dismiss stage because they cannot find relevant comparators. As
the court in Rolph noted, “‘women rarely, if ever, are accused of sexual
harassment’ . . .which suggests that a similarly-situated comparator may
not exist.”258 Further, even if a plaintiff identifies a female student who
has been accused of sexual misconduct, the plaintiff must show that the
female student was accused of committing a similar offense.259 During
the pleadings, plaintiffs typically struggle to obtain data about a university’s treatment of similarly situated female students. 260 The details of
Title IX investigations and hearings are not publicly available, and
therefore plaintiffs are often unable to even know if a similarly situated
female student exists.
Because plaintiffs often cannot uncover evidence of the university’s
treatment of similarly situated women prior to the motion to dismiss,
courts should consider permitting limited discovery to uncover potential
evidence of female comparators. Trial judges have enormous discretion
over the discovery process.261 When deciding whether and how to conduct discovery, “the principal goal of judges should be to reduce or balance the costs and burdens of unnecessary discovery against those of
undue delay.”262 Plaintiffs seeking evidence of a female comparator ask
for a relatively circumscribed set of data. Universities are likely to already have information about cases stored in a database, particularly given that universities must report Title IX cases to the Department of Education.263 Because universities are unlikely to be significantly burdened
by this type of discovery, courts should permit plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery in order to uncover female comparators.

257. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Dayton, 766 F. App’x 275, 281 (6th Cir. 2019) (arguing
that hearing officer arbitrarily discredited testimony from men while crediting testimony from women).
258. Rolph, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 404.
259. See Doe v. Haas, 427 F. Supp. 3d at 357 (dismissing plaintiff’s selective enforcement
claim because plaintiff failed to allege that proceedings “were not initiated against
similarly situated females or that similarly situated females found guilty of the same
offense received a less severe penalty”).
260. See, e.g., Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177 (D. R.I. 2016).
261. Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions to Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 73 (2012).
262. Id. at 72.
263. Compliance Overview of Title IX, DFSCA, and FERPA, CLERY CENTER, https://
clerycenter.org/policy-resources/title-ix-related-acts/ [https://perma.cc/3V9P-QSDS].
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Erroneous outcome claims tend to be more successful than selective
enforcement claims, likely because plaintiffs often do not need discovery
to allege the facts necessary for an erroneous outcome claim. Erroneous
outcome plaintiffs often allege that the university exhibited gender bias
by preferring the female complainant to the male respondent. Because
the plaintiff was a party in the Title IX hearing, the plaintiff has access
to the details of the investigation and the reasoning for the ultimate disciplinary decision. For example, the plaintiff in Doe v. Baum argued that
the university credited all female testimony in his hearing while discrediting all male testimony.264 The plaintiff in Baum did not need discovery
to get access to this information because he was a party in the hearing
and read the Title IX Board’s report. In Doe v. Purdue University, the
hearing officer credited testimony from the female accuser over the male
accused, even though the female accuser did not testify in person or
even submit a statement in her own words.265 The court in Purdue concluded that it was plausible that the university “chose to believe [the accuser] because she is a woman and disbelieve [the accused] because he is
a man.”266 In erroneous outcome cases, the relevant comparator, the female complainant, is readily available to the plaintiff, while in selective
enforcement cases the plaintiff may be unaware of relevant comparators.
Though comparators may be harder to identify before discovery in selective enforcement cases, courts should hesitate before dismissing these
claims, particularly when limited discovery would likely identify relevant
comparators.
D. Pressure on Universities to Respond to Sexual Misconduct
Plaintiffs rely on evidence of two types of pressure on universities as
proof that universities were encouraged to exhibit anti-male bias. The
first type of pressure comes from the student body, often after the university’s mishandling of a Title IX complaint. For example, in Doe v.
Columbia, the plaintiff alleged that Columbia faced criticism that it “did
not take seriously the complaints of female students about sexual assaults by male students.”267 A student-run newspaper criticized the Title
IX Officer’s handling of internal investigations. 268 The plaintiff in Columbia alleged that Columbia’s handling of his case was intended to re264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018).
Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019).
Purdue, 928 F.3d at 669.
Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2016).
Columbia, 831 F.3d at 51.
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fute criticisms that the university had mishandled prior Title IX complaints. 269 The court agreed, finding it plausible that the university’s unfair procedures were motivated by gender bias. 270 Similarly, the plaintiff
in Noakes v. Syracuse University alleged that Syracuse adopted unfair investigative and adjudicatory procedures after public criticism of their
handling of Title IX cases. 271
Because discrimination on the part of university decisionmakers
must be inferred from the background indicia of discrimination, public
criticism of a university’s handling of Title IX cases can often be indirect
evidence of discrimination. The above cases, like Columbia, involved
explicitly gendered criticism, with public pressure on the university to
take complaints by women against men seriously. However, the plaintiffs in Noakes and Columbia both also pointed to credibility determinations made by investigators and other particularized facts that supported
an inference of erroneous outcome. The plaintiffs did not rely on public
criticism alone to support a facially plausible claim of gender discrimination, but public criticism did provide a link between the erroneous outcome and gender discrimination.272 Further, the university may have
found the plaintiff guilty irrespective of his actual guilt or innocence in
order to silence criticism. Therefore, a plaintiff must both show that the
university faced criticism of their handling of complaints against male
students, and that the university actually acted. 273 A court should not
accept public criticism alone as evidence of gender bias, particularly
when a plaintiff cannot point to particularized facts suggesting that public criticism factored into the plaintiff’s case. If courts were to accept
public criticism alone as sufficient for a facially plausible claim of gender
discrimination, any plaintiff could survive a motion to dismiss. 274 Those
schools would be essentially precluded from finding any male student
responsible for a Title IX violation during the relevant period of public
criticism. Courts should therefore allow public criticism and particularized evidence of erroneous outcome, when taken together, to support a
claim of gender discrimination.
Columbia, 831 F.3d at 56.
Columbia, 831 F.3d at 56..
Noakes v. Syracuse Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d 397, 414-15 (N.D.N.Y. 2019).
Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F. 3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
A plaintiff could show this by pointing to the university’s credibility determinations
(e.g. crediting testimony from women over testimony from women) or by showing
some other defect with the adjudicatory process.
274. Colleges, Universities Respond to Sexual Violence Investigation, CNN (May 1, 2014),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/us/colleges-sex-complaint-reactions/index.html
[https://perma.cc/TT4A-6L97] (statements by 55 colleges and universities in the
wake of federal investigations into their alleged mishandling of Title IX claims).
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The second type of pressure plaintiffs allege comes from the federal
government’s 2011 DCL and OCR investigations into schools for Title
IX violations. Because the federal government’s Title IX policies apply
to every university receiving federal funds, almost every Title IX plaintiff
argues that federal pressure encouraged the university to exhibit antimale bias.275 The plaintiff in Doe v. College of Wooster alleged that the
2011 DCL encouraged universities to treat “all those accused of sexual
misconduct with a presumption of guilt.”276 Many courts have been
willing to accept that pressure from the federal government supports a
claim of gender discrimination as long as federal pressure is paired with
other facts particular to the plaintiff’s case, like statements by university
officials. At least one court has been willing to accept that pressure from
the federal government, alone, is sufficient to support a plausible claim
of gender bias. 277 Other courts tend to treat the 2011 DCL as a “backdrop” that, when combined with other evidence, supports a claim of
gender bias.278
Courts have incorrectly treated the 2011 DCL as evidence supporting an inference of gender bias. The 2011 DCL avoids using gendered
language, instead referring to “victims” and “perpetrators.” In fact, the
2011 DCL explicitly stated that both men and women can be victims of
sexual violence.279 The 2011 DCL urged schools to pursue more aggressive investigation and adjudication of student-on-student sexual violence. However, the 2011 DCL did not urge schools to punish men in
particular, nor did the 2011 DCL even identify men as the primary perpetrators of sexual violence. As the Court in Doe v. University of Cincinnati stated, “it is not reasonable to infer that [the university] has a policy
of railroading students accused of sexual misconduct simply to appease
the Department of Education and maintain its federal funding.”280 Universities, simply by enforcing Title IX, are not acting with anti-male bias. In order to infer anti-male bias, a court must accept that the 2011
DCL itself fostered an environment in which universities were motivated to act against male students because they are men. No court has provided a compelling rationale for why the 2011 DCL created a climate
275. See Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 2019 WL 1349115 (N.D. Ohio 2019); Doe v. Marymount
Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573; 583 (E.D. Va. 2018); Noakes, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 416;
Doe v. Univ. of Colo., Boulder, 255 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1076 (D. Colo. 2017).
276. Doe v. Coll. of Wooster, 243 F. Supp. 3d 875, 882 (N.D. Ohio 2017).
277. See Marymount, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 573.
278. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F. 3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 2019).
279. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights to Colleague, 2 (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc
/V6JZ-FJR8].
280. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 173 F. Supp. 3d 586, 602 (S.D. Ohio 2016).

2022]

TI TLE I X AND THE ALLEGED VICTIMIZATI ON OF MEN

321

that encouraged schools to discriminate against men. Even if one assumed that the 2011 DCL failed to protect accused students’ due process rights, it does not follow that abrogating due process rights is the
equivalent of discriminating against men.
IV. GOING FORWARD
More aggressive enforcement of Title IX has, unsurprisingly,
prompted a strong backlash among commentators, courts, and male
students accused of sexual assault. In light of these criticisms, the
Trump Administration released new Title IX regulations in May
2020. 281 Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos tweeted that the new rule
“balances the scales of justice on campuses across America.”282 The rule
requires colleges to offer cross-examination and live hearings and permits schools to set the standard of evidence as either preponderance of
the evidence or clear and convincing. 283 If the rule truly does increase
protections for students accused of sexual misconduct, the number of
Title IX anti-male bias lawsuits will likely decline. However, with the
new Biden administration, the federal approach to Title IX may shift to
resemble the Obama administration’s approach. During his campaign,
Biden committed to strengthening Title IX’s application to sexual violence on campus. 284 If Biden does increase enforcement of Title IX, anti-male bias lawsuits will likely increase once again.
A disturbing amount of male college students commit sexual violence. Studies have reported that approximately 11% of male college
students commit rape during college.285 Despite this sobering statistic,
commentators seem to perceive men who commit assault as anomalies.
In particular, commentators often promulgate the myth that campus
rapes are committed by a small number of serial rapists.286 This myth
281. Greta Anderson, U.S. Publishes New Regulations on Campus Sexual Assault, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (May 7, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/07/educationdepartment-releases-final-title-ix-regulations [https://perma.cc/39QY-FPUT].
282. Betsy DeVos (@BetsyDeVosED), TWITTER (May 6, 2020, 11:55 AM), https://
twitter.com/BetsyDeVosED/status/1258062830101815303 [https://perma.cc/WC3THR7V].
283. Anderson, supra note 282.
284. Greta Anderson, A Long and Complicated Road Ahead, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/01/22/biden-faces-title-ix-battle-complicatedpolitics-and-his-own-history [https://perma.cc/5R9X-3SXT].
285. Kevin M. Swartout, Trajectory Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 169
JAMA PEDIATRICS 1148 (2015).
286. CHRIS LINDER, SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS: POWER-CONSCIOUS APPROACHES
TO AWARENESS, PREVENTION, AND RESPONSE 90 (2018).

322

m i c h i ga n j o urn a l of ge n d e r

& la w

[Vol. 28:281

encourages people to believe that the vast majority of accused students
are innocent, particularly if they do not fit the model of an expected
perpetrator, e.g., a stranger with a history of violent sexual assaults. Male
college students, in particular, are likely to believe that “a typical rapist
wears a ski mask, carries a knife, and attacks strangers in dark corners.”287 These stereotypes are concerning because “the perceptions of
perpetrators play a significant role in peoples’ beliefs about the ‘legitimacy’ of sexual assault as a crime and the manner in which guilt is determined.”288 Judge Aaron Persky’s approach to Brock Turner provides
a valuable case study of the consequences of believing stereotypes about
perpetrators. Turner, like Persky, was a white, middle-class, Stanford
athlete. 289 Judges themselves, or their sons, often match the profiles of
the male college students they are supposed to find guilty of sexual assault. Studies of judges’ approaches to sentencing in rape cases have
found that the common sentencing approach is “demonstrably arbitrary
(relying heavily on assumption about who rapes) and prejudicial to the
victims of the crime.”290 Judges who consider themselves “good guys”
may be unwilling to conclude that alleged perpetrators who also fit the
“good guy” profile committed sexual violence.
Along with perpetrator stereotypes, people often believe that there
is a “gray area” of rape. 291 This narrative views campus rapists as “basically good guys who, because of a combination of too much alcohol and
too little communication, end up coercing sex on their partners.”292 Because of these factors, observers may perceive these men as being unfairly punished for conduct that lacked malicious intent.293 Judge Persky in
the Turner case exhibited this view when, during sentencing, he stated
that “the argument can be made that it’s more morally culpable for
someone with no alcohol in their system to commit an offense like
that.”294 In surveys of college students, up to three-quarters of perpetra287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Martinez et al., supra note 45 at 2.
Id. at 7.
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Rebecca Chennells, Sentencing: The “Real Rape” Myth, 82 GENDER & LEGAL SYS. 23,
34 (2009).
Maddie Brockbank, The Myth of the “Gray Area” of Rape: Fabricating Ambiguity and
Deniability, 4 DIGNITY: J. ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & VIOLENCE 1 (2019).
David Lisak, Predators: Uncomfortable Truths About Campus Rapists, 19 J. OF NEW
ENG. BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. 19 (2004).
Brockbank, supra note 291, at 6-7.
Sam Levin, Stanford Sexual Assault: Read the Full Text of the Judge’s Controversial Decision, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun
/14/stanford-sexual-assault-read-sentence-judge-aaron-persky [https://perma.cc/9NL6TBVJ].
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tors of sexual assault were drinking alcohol prior to the assault.295 Antonia Abbey explains that the co-occurrence of alcohol and sexual assault
does not necessarily mean alcohol causes sexual assault; instead, “men
may consciously or unconsciously drink prior to committing sexual assault to have an excuse for their behavior.”296 Judges and commentators
validate the idea that alcohol diminishes a perpetrator’s responsibility by
treating intoxicated perpetrators as less culpable than sober perpetrators.
Critics also describe Title IX procedures as punishing men of color
at disproportionately high rates.297 Some critics have used concerns
about men of color to support limiting Title IX enforcement or to justify lowering the pleading standards used by courts in male Title IX lawsuits. 298 Anecdotal evidence suggests that men of color are disproportionately accused of sexual misconduct in the university setting, though
currently no large-scale studies have been conducted to confirm or rebut
this claim.299 There is reason to suspect men of color may be disproportionately accused, particularly when stereotypes cast poor men of color
as the most common perpetrators of sexual violence.300 Universities
should do more to ensure nondiscriminatory application of Title IX
regulations. However, it is unclear that increasing due process protections or scaling back Title IX is the correct solution. First, any benefits
stemming from more due process protections would likely accrue disproportionately to white men, given both of these solutions operate in a
system that almost invariably advantages and rewards white men. Second, scaling back Title IX or increasing due process would likely work
to disadvantage women of color, individuals who are frequently ignored
by critics using men of color as a talisman in arguing against Title IX.
Women of color, particularly Black women, are disproportionately victims of sexual violence. 301 Perpetrators and victims are not cleanly divid295. Antonia Abbey, Alcohol-Related Sexual Assault: A Common Problem Among College
Students, 14 J. STUD. ALCOHOL SUPP. 118, 119 (2002).
296. Id. at 19.
297. Fang, supra note 12, at 492.
298. Id.
299. Emily Yoffe, The Question of Race in Campus Sexual-Assault Cases, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/thequestion-of-race-in-campus-sexual-assault-cases/539361/ [https://perma.cc/R6H6-X6T9]
(suggesting that while anecdotal evidence might suggest higher rates of clams against
male students of color, no large-scale studies have been done to confirm or rebut that
claim).
300. Martinez et al., supra note 45, at 2.
301. Susan Green, Violence Against Black Women – Many Types, Far-Reaching Effects, INST.
FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH. (July 13, 2017), https://iwpr.org/iwpr-issues/raceethnicity-gender-and-economy/violence-against-black-women-many-types-far-reachingeffects/ [https://perma.cc/9XJV-6X3L].

324

m i c h i ga n j o urn a l of ge n d e r

& la w

[Vol. 28:281

ed along racial lines; many men of color are accused by women of color. 302 Scaling back Title IX, or increasing barriers to winning Title IX
hearings, risks abandoning these women in an attempt to protect men
of color, who likely will not benefit from these efforts in the same way
white men will.
An impressive amount of attention and sympathy has been given to
male students accused of sexual violence, likely due to the misconceptions earlier discussed. It is important to consider how Title IX antimale bias lawsuits have come to cast male students accused of sexual violence as victims, often at the expense of victims of sexual assault. Many
people seem to believe that while sexual assault happens at unacceptably
high rates, individual men whom they personally know could not possibly have committed an assault. Instead, individual men are perceived as
victims of an unjust adjudicatory process designed to scapegoat them for
a problem in which they had no role. However, if individual male college students have no role in the scourge of campus sexual assaults, who
is to blame? Many critics blame women themselves, who have supposedly misclassified “gray rape” as rape rape. 303 Critics of Title IX procedures
should be careful to avoid insinuating that campus rape is an overstated
problem.
Critics have described the 2011 DCL as creating a process that discriminated against men as a class. Now that OCR has promulgated new
regulations, lawyers bringing Title IX anti-male bias lawsuits should
consider what they hope to achieve with these lawsuits. Schools are now
required to implement cross-examination and live hearings, two procedural protections that almost every plaintiff requested. Hopefully, those
procedural protections will increase confidence in the outcomes of campus disciplinary proceedings. If accused students feel that they have
gone through a fair process, it might mitigate the need for lawsuits of
the kind discussed in this Note. When attorneys continue to bring these
cases, even after schools have instituted the requested due process pro302. AMIA SRINIVASAN discusses this more thoroughly in The Conspiracy Against Men, in
THE RIGHT TO SEX (2021), where she discusses accusations by Black women against
Virginia’s Lieutenant Governor Justin Fairfax and Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas.
303. See Ashe Shaw, Overly Broad Definition of Sex Assault Ensnares Innocent Students,
WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/overly-broaddefinition-of-sex-assault-ensnares-innocent-students [https://perma.cc/4BCL-28GZ].
See also Emily Yoffe, The Uncomfortable Truth About Campus Rape Policy, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/theuncomfortable-truth-about-campus-rape-policy/538974/ [https://perma.cc/HPY6BU56] (describing various Title IX allegations that the reader is meant to infer are insufficiently severe to constitute actionable sexual misconduct).
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tections, they risk forcing schools into a position where they are unable
to implement Title IX without facing liability. Merely working to prevent sexual violence, even if men are disproportionately punished, is not
sex discrimination. 
***

